oblivioustransfer alternatives and similar packages
Based on the "Cryptography" category.
Alternatively, view oblivioustransfer alternatives based on common mentions on social networks and blogs.

cryptohash
DISCONTINUED. efficient and practical cryptohashing in haskell. DEPRECATED in favor of cryptonite 
cipherblowfish
DISCONTINUED. DEPRECATED by cryptonite; A collection of cryptographic block and stream ciphers in haskell 
cipheraes
DEPRECATED  use cryptonite  a comprehensive fast AES implementation for haskell that supports aesni and advanced cryptographic modes. 
cryptopubkey
DISCONTINUED. DEPRECATED  use cryptonite  Cryptographic public key related algorithms in haskell (RSA,DSA,DH,ElGamal) 
cipheraes128
DISCONTINUED. Based on cipheraes, but using a cryptoapi interface and providing resulting IVs for each mode 
cryptonumbers
DISCONTINUED. DEPRECATED  use cryptonite  Cryptographic number related function and algorithms 
cryptorandom
DISCONTINUED. DEPRECATED  use cryptonite  Cryptographic random class and entropy gatherer with safe API for haskell
InfluxDB  Power RealTime Data Analytics at Scale
* Code Quality Rankings and insights are calculated and provided by Lumnify.
They vary from L1 to L5 with "L5" being the highest.
Do you think we are missing an alternative of oblivioustransfer or a related project?
README
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a cryptographic primitive in which a sender transfers some of potentially many pieces of information to a receiver. The sender doesn't know which pieces of information have been transferred.
1outof2 OT
Oblivious transfer is central to many of the constructions for secure multiparty computation. In its most basic form, the sender has two secret messages as inputs, m0 and m1; the receiver has a choice bit c as input. At the end of the 1outof2 OT protocol, the receiver should only learn message Mc, while the sender should not learn the value of the receiver's input c.
The protocol is defined for elliptic curves over finite fields E(Fq). The set of points E(Fq) is a finite abelian group. It works as follows:
 Alice samples a random a and computes A = aG. Sends A to Bob
 Bob has a choice c. He samples a random b.
 If c is 0, then he computes B = bG.
 If c is 1, then he computes B = A + bG.
Sends B to Alice
 Alice derives two keys:
 K0 = aB
 K1 = a(B  A)
It's easy to check that Bob can derive the key Kc corresponding to his choice bit, but cannot compute the other one.
1outofN OT
The 1outofN oblivious transfer protocol is a natural generalization of the 1outof2 OT protocol, in which the sender has a vector of messages (M0, ..., Mn1). The receiver only has a choice c.
We implement a protocol for random OT, where the sender, Alice, outputs n random keys and the receiver, Bob, only learns one of them. It consists on three parts:
Setup
Alice samples a ∈ Zp and computes A = aG and T = aA, where G and p are the generator and the order of the curve, respectively. She sends A to Bob, who aborts if A is not a valid point in the curve.
Choose
Bob takes his choice c ∈ Zn, samples b ∈ Zp and replies R = cA + bG. Alice aborts if R is not a valid point in the curve.
Key derivation
For all e ∈ Zn, Alice computes ke = aR  eT. She now has a vector of keys (k0, ..., kn1).
Bob computes kR = bA.
We can see that the key ke = aR  eT = abG + (c  e)T. If e = c, then kc = abG = bA = kR. Therefore, kR = kc if both parties are honest.
{# LANGUAGE ScopedTypeVariables #}
import Protolude
import Data.Curve.Weierstrass.SECP256K1
import qualified OT
testOT :: Integer > IO Bool
testOT n = do
 Alice sets up the procotol
(sPrivKey, sPubKey, t) :: (Fr, PA, PA) < OT.setup
 Bob picks a choice bit 'c'
(rPrivKey, response, c) < OT.choose n sPubKey
 Alice computes a set of n keys
let senderKeys = OT.deriveSenderKeys n sPrivKey response t
 Bob only gets to know one out of n keys. Alice doesn't know which one
let receiverKey = OT.deriveReceiverKey rPrivKey sPubKey
pure $ receiverKey == (senderKeys !! fromInteger c)
koutofN OT
1outofN oblivious transfer can be generalised one step further into koutofN. This is very similar in structure to the methods above comprising the same 3 parts:
Setup As above, Alice samples a ∈ Zp and computes A = aG and T = aA, where G and p are the generator and the order of the curve, respectively. She sends A to Bob, who aborts if A is not a valid point in the curve.
Choose Bob takes his choices ci ∈ Zn, samples bi ∈ Zp and replies Ri = ciA + biG. Alice aborts if Ri is not a valid point in the curve.
Key derivation
For all ei ∈ Zn, Alice computes kei = aRi  eiT. She now has a vector of vectors of keys (k0i, ..., kn1i).
Bob computes kRi = biA.
We can see that the key kei = aRi  eiT = abiG + (ci  ei)T. If e = c, then kci = abiG = biA = kRi. Therefore, kRi = kci if both parties are honest.
References:
 Chou, T. and Orlandi, C. "The Simplest Protocol for Oblivious Transfer" Technische Universiteit Eindhoven and Aarhus University
Notation:
k: Lowercase letters are scalars. P: Uppercase letters are points in an elliptic curve. kP: Multiplication of a point P with a scalar k over an elliptic curve defined over a finite field modulo a prime number.
License
Copyright 20182020 Adjoint Inc
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*Note that all licence references and agreements mentioned in the oblivioustransfer README section above
are relevant to that project's source code only.